RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN
GREEN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

for achieving the goals of the climate convention
therefore remains a contentious issue and high on the
agenda for many parties, although currently outside the
technology mechanism created in Cancun.

Robert Percival and Alan Miller
Global climate change represents the most difficult
environmental challenge facing the world today. The
struggle to reach consensus on a global policy for
responding to it has exposed sharp divisions between
developed countries and the developing world. There
is wide recognition that a global transformation toward
a green energy infrastructure is necessary and perhaps
even essential; analyses by the International Energy
Agency conclude that keeping atmospheric carbon
dioxide within environmentally necessary levels
requires a technology “revolution.” However, there is
considerable uncertainty over the best means for
bringing this about. Although technological innovation
can play an important role in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, developing countries fear that principles of
intellectual property law will hinder the transfer of
green energy innovations to them.
The recent decisions at COP 16 in Cancun produced
some agreements on technology issues without
resolving some underlying tensions. The parties agreed
to establish a technology mechanism including a
technology executive committee (TEC) and a Climate
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The TEC
was given a broad mandate to promote transfer of
technology for climate mitigation and adaptation
including analysis of technology needs, barriers, and
policy issues. The CTCN provides a potential means
of advancing these objectives via a network of
organizations with the capacity to provide advice and
support technology transfer activities, including
identifying and promoting best practices, building local
institutional capacity, and reaching out to public and
private stakeholders. Developing countries had sought
to include intellectual property supporting technology
innovation and transfer, but this was opposed by
industrialized countries and excluded. In the waning
hours of the Cancun negotiations, Bolivia noted the
dominant ownership of clean technology patents by
industrialized countries in stating its opposition to the
final agreement (see table, Clean Technology Patents
by Country). The importance of intellectual property

The green technology transfer debate has centered on
the possibility of relaxing intellectual property rights
(IPRs) to facilitate the transfer of technologies from
developed to developing countries that would not
otherwise be able to afford them. Arguments in favor
of relaxing IPRs generally stress that the ability of
national governments to use strategies such as
compulsory licensing is justified by a compelling public
“health” or “emergency” interest. Opponents generally
maintain that relaxing IPRs will discourage innovation
by reducing potential financial rewards, particularly
with respect to very dynamic markets like the global
renewable energy technology market at a time when a
growing number of countries (including developing
nations) are implementing various initiatives to facilitate
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and encourage renewable energy research and
development.
Until recently, technology transfer has been left to the
dynamic of international market forces and the business
decisions of transnational corporations. These forces
placed a premium on IPR protection and created
“supply-side restrictions” and “demand-side
limitations” that in turn were perceived to create
obstacles to otherwise economically and
environmentally valuable transfers of technology.
Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, Intellectual
Property, and Technology Transfer to Address
Climate Change, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69, 86 (2009). Recently, international
institutions have begun to establish frameworks to
facilitate the transfer of green technology from
developed countries to developing countries,
responding to ideas promoted in the convention
negotiations and anticipating the need for new initiatives
in preparation for the 2012 expiration of the Kyoto
Protocol. Mei Gechlik, Making Transfer of Clean
Technology Work: Lessons of the Clean
Development Mechanism, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
227, 228 (2009).
In December of 2008 the climate change negotiations
in Bali produced a draft technology transfer agreement
that enumerated certain goals for future progress,
“including technology needs assessment, joint R&D
programs, a healthy technology transfer environment,
and licenses.” Michael Hasper, Green Technology in
Developing Countries: Creating Accessibility
Through a Global Exchange Forum, 2009 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 1 (Jan. 15, 2009). The United States
and the European Union had hoped to eliminate tariffs
on climate change mitigation techniques to facilitate the
flow of ideas into developing countries, but developing
countries were skeptical that the proposal was merely
“disguised protectionism” to boost exports. The parties
also clashed over whether to relax IPRs to facilitate the
smooth flow of technology consistent with the
argument that developing countries must “leapfrog”
over dirty technologies to a new generation of clean
alternatives.

To facilitate developing country leapfrogging, Hasper
recommends tapping into the market for green
technology in developing countries through the use of a
global technology exchange forum that brings
technology holders, venture capitalists, and domestic
entrepreneurs together to reduce information
asymmetries and transaction costs. He also urges that
those participating in the developing country green
technology markets not neglect the role of indigenous
firms better aware of local needs and thus better
positioned to implement technologies that meet local
needs. Perhaps explicitly incorporating this awareness
into technology transfer plans and programs such as
those to be implemented by the Cancun Agreements
will ease developing countries’ concerns that
developed countries are only interested in reducing
climate change technology tariffs to increase exports.
(Ironically the United States has recently found itself on
the other side of this issue, complaining to the World
Trade Organization about Chinese subsidies for export
of wind machines and restricting defense procurement
of imported renewable energy equipment.)
There is a growing interest in creating a global
technology exchange forum that follows the opensource operating system model; a sort of “Wikipedia”
of green technology exchange. Jerome H. Reichman,
Intellectual Property in International Perspective:
Institute for Intellectual Property & Information
Law Symposium, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1147–48
(2009). One global exchange scheme already in
operation is the Eco-Patent Commons. Companies
have offered a number of patents with environmental
benefits free of charge through the Eco-Patent
Commons with one limitation: defensive termination. If
a non-pledger attempts to assert a patent against a
pledger, the pledger has the option to defensively
terminate its non-assert agreement (i.e., agreement not
to sue). Since launching in 2008, the Eco-Patent
Commons has received approximately 100 ecofriendly patent pledges. This year, Green Xchange will
start a partnership with Creative Commons and will
provide eco-friendly patents for fixed annual licensing
fees. Voluntary patent-sharing forums such as EcoCommons and Green Xchange are praised as
alternatives to making substantive changes to the law,
which means these forums are inherently a faster means
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of exchanging green technology. Estelle Derclaye, Not
Only Innovation but also Collaboration, Funding,
Goodwill and Commitment: Which Role for Patent
Laws in Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Action,
9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. (Special Issue)
657 (2010). More such efforts might be promoted by
the technology mechanism.
Asignificant portion of recent literature on technology
transfer to developing countries has focused on
resisting substantive changes to the law on the grounds
that IPR protection spurs innovation and is essential for
attracting foreign direct investment. However, other
studies suggest that stronger IPRs are not necessary
and may in fact hinder green technology transfer.
Reichman has suggested that developing countries can
accommodate developed countries’ standards for
patent protections in a way that better facilitates
technology transfer by “adopting relatively stringent
eligibility standards covering subject matter, novelty,
nonobviousness, and disclosure.” India has
aggressively pursued this strategy to meet development
goals in its pharmaceutical industry, establishing a strict
nonobviousness standard that requires “a technical
advance” or economic significance. Recently passed
Chinese patent law adopts a broader, more absolute
novelty standard and also requires disclosure of origin
for genetic resources. The United States has also
recently begun to tighten its patent eligibility standards,
though not as much as India.
The ratification in 1995 of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) first introduced intellectual property law into
international trade. The agreement applies to all
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO);
developing country members were granted a grace
period of a decade to comply. In 2001, WTO
members in Doha adopted a declaration entitled
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health” in response to growing concerns that IPRs
could restrict access to affordable medicines for
populations in developing countries in their efforts to
control diseases of public health importance, such as
HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria. The declaration
recognizes concerns about adverse effects of IPRs on
prices to consumers and sets out conditions under

which a government can license a third party without
the consent of the patent holder. The Doha declaration
also extended the grace period for compliance with
TRIPS to January 2016 for least developed countries
(WHO 2010).
Another method for circumventing strong IPR
protections is to allow compulsory licensing and related
measures. Compulsory licensing is permitted under
TRIPS in times of “emergency” and has generally been
used for pharmaceutical products used to fight
epidemics such as HIV/AIDS. Recent use of
compulsory licensing has expanded the scope of its
application to include pharmaceuticals used to treat
long-term health problems such as heart disease and
cancer. Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify
Compulsory Licensing of Green Technology?, 6
B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 24 (2009). Some
argue that climate change is a long-term health problem
or that it is an “emergency,” thus justifying the use of
compulsory licensing to increase access to green
technology.
An example of effective use of compulsory licensing
was the 2005 action by Brazil to break HIV/AIDS
pharmaceutical patents owned by Abbott Laboratories
by suspending the patents and authorizing the
production of generic versions of the drugs. This saved
Brazil $250 million when Abbott responded by
lowering the price it had charged for its antiretroviral
drugs. Similarly, Thailand approved compulsory
licensing for an AIDS drug in 2007 after failing in
negotiations to reduce the cost of the drugs. The WTO
upheld these exceptions as legitimate under Article 30
of the TRIPS agreement. Many European countries
have codified compulsory licensing provisions into
patent laws that are compatible with the TRIPS
agreement, though until recently patent authorities were
reluctant to grant compulsory licenses despite these
provisions. German intellectual property law permits
the most controversial TRIPS flexibility: compulsory
licenses in the interest of public welfare. Nevertheless,
Germany continues as a leader of green technology
and apparently has yet to exercise the power of
compulsory licensing in the green technology sector.
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The use of compulsory licenses has generally been
reserved to the pharmaceutical industry and countries
have taken other intellectual property avenues to
promote green technology transfer. Professor Derclaye
suggests several IPR incentives that could be used to
promote green technology, including “accelerated
examination, reduction, cancellation or waiver fees,
removal of green inventions from deferred examination,
earlier publication and/or priority at the opposition and
infringement stages, [and] stronger protection.” One
example is the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property
Office fast track system for green technology, also
referred to as the “Green Channel.” As of May 12,
2009, patent applications for green technologies can
take advantage of an accelerated procedure in which
the applicant simply makes a request in writing making
“a reasonable assertion that the invention in the patent
application is one which has some environmental
benefit,” and “which actions [he/she] wish[es] to
accelerate: Search, Combined Search and
Examination, Publication, and/or Examination.” The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office introduced a similar
system in December of 2009. Expansion and
Extension of the Green Technology Pilot Program,75
Fed. Reg. 69,049-50 (Nov. 10, 2010) (Dec. 8,
2009). Australia and South Korea have also launched
similar programs and China, Japan, and Brazil have
expressed interest in following suit. Thus, although
international institutions and nations have yet to strike
IPRs with a heavy blow in the interest of green
technology transfer, it seems as though some countries
are slowly moving toward more fluid movement of
green technology by making minor yet significant
adjustments to patent procedures. Maskus and Okediji
question whether approaches relying primarily on the
threat of compulsory licensing can be very effective.
“[N]on-voluntary mechanisms tend to discourage the
efficacy of any technology gained thereby, particularly
where associated data and know-how are integral to
the use or adaptation” of the technology. They
advocate a mix of financial inducements and more
streamlined systems of licensing to create a range of
options. Maskus & Okediji, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO
ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES AND
POLICY OPTIONS (International Centre for Trade and
Development, 2010). Bilateral and multilateral

environmental agreements can create a climate for
technology cooperation such that otherwise patentable
knowledge is freely shared. For example, the United
States and China recently agreed to the creation of a
Joint Clean Energy Research Center, with a
commitment of $150 million over five years shared
evenly between the two countries. The Montreal
Protocol experience also provides numerous examples
of international collaboration to share environmental
technology in the context of phasing out ozonedepleting chemicals. In several instances expert teams
were formed to solve common technical problems
arising from the phaseout, often bringing together
technical staff from private firms competing in the
market. STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN, K. MADHAVA SARMA
& KRISTEN N. TADDONIO, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR
THE OZONE LAYER: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
(2007).
Conclusion
This paper examines claims that intellectual property
law, which is designed to create incentives for
innovation, actually may inhibit the transfer to
developing countries of green energy innovations.
Although the paper cannot find significant examples of
green energy technologies whose diffusion has been
hindered by existing intellectual property protections, it
explores strategies, such as compulsory licensing
schemes, for responding to such problems if and when
they arise in the future. The paper concludes that
intellectual property law need not be an obstacle to a
global transformation toward a green energy
infrastructure that can promote economic development
while advancing new levels of international
cooperation.
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